THE ARYAN PATH

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July 1968

GUEST EDITORIAL by P. NAGARAJA RAO

The Two Views

E. G. LEE

The Situation As It Is

TERENCE WHITE GERVAIS
V. V. RAMANA MURTI

In Memoriam: Martin Luther King

J. N. CHUBB

Indian Philosophy and Social Concern

BOOKS REVIEWED INCLUDE

Rudyard Kipling: Realist and Fabulist; Reason in Existentialism; The Commonwealth of the Mind; "Instinct" and "Intelligence"; Companion to the Qur'ān; The Ancient Sun Kingdoms of the Americas; Indian Dances

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does the Evening Star
those who tread their path in darkness.

Editor:
SOPHIA WADIA

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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and
lost among the host — as does the evening star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

— *The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XXXIX JULY 1968 No. 7

P. NAGARAJA RAO

The Two Views

[Our old friend Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao contributes this Guest Editorial to set forth what he sees as the major conflicting attitude-patterns of men today. Students of Indian philosophy — and Dr. Nagaraja Rao is a life-long one — will see the reflections of the tremendous sixteenth chapter of the *Gītā*.—ED.]

Two things fill my mind with wonder and awe, the more often and the more intently the mind of thought is given to them — the *starry heavens above* and the moral law within.

—KANT

All is clear, I alone am clouded!

—LAO-TZE

A SENSE OF VALUES enables us to entertain a just conception of the ends of life. Two views are being advocated by thinkers in recent times. There are those who believe in no trans-empirical values and confine all knowledge to the scientific method and tangible experiment and laboratory proof. They believe also in the active life and in endless additions to their possessions. They strive hard, elbow out their fellow men, and aggressively seek wealth and power and energy, dominating others. They banish all reflection as speculative nonsense. Many followers of this view are determined to go in for excitement, pleasure, and self-interest. They want all the time to be doing something or other. Peace and stillness are anathema to them. They fill their hours with the titillation of the senses, gathering sensations by resorting increasingly to sex, sports, and sometimes to drugs or crime. They are prone to violence when questioned, and are intolerant of all opposition. They pride themselves on their way of life and call their restless change progress.

Progress is the modern ideal, the child of industrialism and science. Those who halt, think, and banish hurry from life are described as unduly indolent and undeserving of survival. These "progressives" identify whatever they desire as the desirable also. In the words of Lord Reith Stoneheaken, "Man is becoming absorbed with things rather than with convictions, with the verb 'to have' than with the verb 'to be,' with goods rather than with conviction. And that of course is the damnation of man or a society." In the past civilizations have perished and sovereign rulers have come to their doom by lust and aggression.

The aggressive temper seeks to manipulate anything it gets hold of to selfish advantage. It never occurs to such a one to contemplate the beauty of a flower; he seeks to fasten it in a button-hole. The sole end pursued is the maximum gratification of desires and for their fulfilment, people fight and become corrupt and often seek money in disgraceful ways. All the time they are self-assertive and dogmatic, deny freedom to others, seek to dominate others and ruthlessly exploit the weak, and convert all cruelly to their way and view of life. They are all for war and violence. They believe in no creed except self-interest and no code except might and cunning. Their ideal man is the ruthless strong man of unrestrained expression described as "the superman" by Nietzsche. Their twin ideals are military prowess and industrial enterprise, if these can be called ideals. To them all life is one hectic movement directed to no end further than death.

The second view of life, traced by the saints and savants of humanity, affirms a faith in values. This ideal is best summed up by the Chinese philosopher, Lao-Tze, and elaborated by his disciple Chuang Tze: "production without possession, development without domination, and action without self-assertion." One can be active and avoid indolence, and still keep the values of life intact. The supreme mark of human life is creativity. This can be preserved only by ensuring freedom to ourselves, at least mental freedom, though we cannot help the physical and natural limitations that environ us. Those of us who respect the value of human life and the dignity of man will not clutch at things with a miser's grip. We will learn to sit loose to our possessions and share them with others. We will be trustees of the wealth we possess, and will not treat it solely as a resource for the gratification of our lusts and desires. In the words of the *Bhāgavata,* "we have a claim only to so much as would satisfy hunger. If anyone desires more, he is a thief deserving punishment." Such men do not pursue riches. In their quest for a livelihood they do not forget the quality or the ends of life. They seek the minimum necessary. They do not crave for affluence at the cost of others. The *Gītā* regards acquisitiveness as a great sin and describes sacrifice as the sovereign instrument

created by the Lord for the use of men in getting their all (III. 10). He who enjoys his all without giving a portion to others is verily a thief (III. 12).

They regard restlessness and pugnacity as great evils; for these two fill our lives with discontent, and incapacitate us for the enjoyment of beauty, and make us almost incapable of contemplative virtues. They produce but do not suffer from the itch for possession. They respect the law of *svadharma*, and live a peaceful life. They hold to their ideals not with fierce persecution of others but with a firm and gentle integrity. They keep to their *Dharma* and show exquisite manners and perfect courtesy. Their courtesy is not merely conventional. It is the expression of their faith. "In art, they aim at being exquisite, and in life at being reasonable." Their humour is delicate and not vulgar or broad. They always express themselves in understatements. They do not believe in vehemence and noise. To them, "to be" is more important than "to do." They are not fanatical in their faith. They are friends of all Faiths. They do not believe in a powerful priesthood or impossible rituals and rigid dogmas. They are strong without violence. They say, "Religions are many, but reason is one." The contemplative temper retains the capacity for civilized enjoyment, for leisure and laughter, for pleasure in sunshine and sports in the field. These men seek "money" only as it is needed for normal enjoyment of life, not out of avarice, and not as an instrument of power. They are content to remain poor. They are the salt of the earth and it is through them that light filters into our world of darkness. These men belong to no church, no country or nation. They are world-men, and their community is the world. Narrowness does not touch them. The whole world is their family. To do good is their religion.

Hillary and Tensing together climbed to unsurmounted heights, stood for a while on the highest mountain peak of the world. They beheld the world as one at their feet. When they descended, they were beset with questions from the world like, Did Hillary reach the top of Everest first or did Tensing? From the sublime height, they saw the world as one. But at the foot of the mountains the world was divided into East and West. Hillary and Tensing, who had seen the world as one, replied that they had reached the peak together. No comment is necessary.

P. NAGARAJA RAO

E. G. LEE

The Situation As It Is

[Readers will remember the Rev. Mr. E. G. Lee's article on "The Retreat from the Infinite" (THE ARYAN PATH, December 1967). In this interesting article he gives us a lucid survey of some recent changes in the Western religious scene with implications for all organized religions as such; for he points out the vast unorganized religious concern that has sprung from the inadequate and unsatisfying nature of the industrialized and mass-oriented modern life. This concern seems to have behind it two impulsions that are recognized by the *Gītā* as basic to spiritual inquiry. The *Gītā* speaks of the "afflicted" who seek God and are dear to Him; it also speaks of seeking Wisdom by strong search, questions, and humility. Many of these psychological qualities, according to the Rev. Mr. Lee, are exerting their influence in the situation as it is.—ED.]

SOMETHING TOTALLY UNEXPECTED has happened to religion during the past decade. It has suddenly come alive again. Not in a manner that could have been foreseen in the past, but in a manner that involves, either consciously or unconsciously, everyone who troubles about issues lifted out of the run of secular events. The latter are banal and unfulfilling, leading nowhere in the perplexities that beat upon the personal life, or in the civilizations that appear to have no goal save self-perpetuation. The dogma of progress for progress' sake, with no deeper tones within it of spiritual fulfilment, leaves many people desolate. And the desolation has been described adequately enough by the contemporary poets, writers, dramatists, and artists who are aware of our preoccupation with things as things. Our spiritual emptiness has been noted by men who feel the same emptiness without being able to do much about it, except to describe it faithfully and feel the wounds it leaves. Within this situation the cry of religion has been heard, and in a way that could not have been anticipated two or three decades ago.

An educated man's opinion about religion in the nineteen-thirties could well be summarized by the following quotation from the preface to the late Geoffrey Faber's sensitive appreciation of the religious life in Cardinal Newman and his friends, in *The Oxford Apostles*:

> Surely, to the most determined ostriches, it must be evident that the hold of the Churches ... over the more educated (let alone the less educated) public is not what it was ... Indeed this rot, or process of emancipation (whichever you like to call it) has gone so far that a book which has the appearance of dealing with religion is simply not thought readable by the great majority of educated young or young middle-aged people.

During this decade, *Honest to God*, the Bishop of Woolwich's well-

known book, has sold over a million copies, and the publishing houses report an excellent sale for religious books.

Exactly what is happening it would be hard to say. Even the churches, in spite of their decline, can hardly be written off. After all *Honest to God* came from them, and through the whole range of the Christian Church there is intense ferment. Outside them of course there is obviously inquiry, almost a chaotic inquiry, about the spiritual problems left upon our hands by the mass civilizations. This, after all, is to be expected. There is nothing odd about it. That people should be troubled about their spiritual fate in the new world that threatens them is rationally to be expected. But the trouble is of a certain kind; and in that lies its religious nature.

Two world wars during the past fifty years, not to mention all the smaller wars sandwiched in between and following afterwards — some of them described as the most cruel in history — have created a shivering distrust of mankind's problems being settled on the secular level. National and international politics have not gone very far in satisfying the hunger of the soul in a world of mass physical hunger, overpopulation, and cold-faced, secret, scientific warfare carried out in terms of sham peace by all the great powers. And few hands are clean. Most of the great industrial powers, either directly or indirectly, are creating more and more horrible weapons intended to inflict death on a mass scale and in the most painful way. Burning in the Middle Ages was regarded as a terrible death to be carried out in due solemnity because the Devil was involved. Burning today, in the current wars, is almost incidental, to be inflicted on the enemy as a casual event; and there is no Devil around to sanction it. Mass slaughter is one of the achievements of our contemporary civilization, and it is all done in the name of the secular values of our political structures. And a good many people are unhappy about it.

They are unhappy also about the personal issues involved. What is the meaning of the personal life in this secular world; where does it begin and how does it end, and why? These questions are being asked, and if not asked in a relevant way inside organized religion they are being asked outside.

Furthermore, for those people with memories, and particularly for the young who are forced to reflect, the past fifty years have left, and cause, certain wounds in the soul; and all the current affluence and social care of the great societies cannot stanch them. Most of the wars were wars of ideals, or proclaimed to be so; most of the armed revolutions were revolutions of ideals; and although the present is more acceptable than the past it cannot heal the pain that is left.

In spite of ideals, indeed — more horrible still — because of them, men have been "evil from head to toe." The reflecting person cannot contemplate the blood and agony of the past fifty years without facing some kind of horror in the inner life of everyone concerned. A ferment about this is to be expected — and more particularly outside organized religions; for the latter, after all, in one way or another were in it up to the hilt.

It is as useful a truth as any other in this contemporary situation that man is not born for a day, or his children, and from this basis questions are bound to be asked. They may be met by the snarled jokes of the satirists, but this in itself forces questions perhaps more agonizing than the others.

There is then a very real ferment about religion. It is generally assumed that traditional theology does not come into this — "theology" is regarded as an "out" word in any case. But something of a very powerful theological nature has happened in our world, in particular the Christian world, and although it may not be recognized it has had tremendous consequences.

There is now in Christian countries a wide disbelief among educated people in the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ, i.e., disbelief in his person as defined by the doctrine of the Trinity. It may be said that there is little perceptible conflict about this, or even interest. It is not a talking point, for instance, between the public agnostics and the public defenders of the Christian religion. Indeed there is comparatively little literature about it as compared with the beginning of this century, when it was a subject of some consequence. But this is deceptive. Belief in the existence of God is involved. Traditional Christianity interprets the nature of God through the nature of Christ; Christ is "God made flesh," seen upon the historic scene, and if there is no longer a belief in Christ in the traditional sense then much has happened to belief in God. In a sense, in a Christian sense, God has departed from the historic scene; he can no longer be imaginatively conceived in the person of Christ, and this is a grave matter indeed.

If men want to believe in God, and if the traditional way is now barred to them, they have to engage upon a new spiritual discovery, and that is probably what is taking place. The breakdown of theological doctrine and the experience that goes with it is forcing men to undertake their own salvation, and that probably accounts for the ferment outside organized religion.

It would be wrong, of course, to suppose that established religion is not involved. It is, very much so. Nevertheless there is a religion of inquiry independent of organization, almost inchoate in its search, des-

perate in its absence of focus, yet instant and real; and it can be contrasted with traditional belief.

Other events too, apart from a theological revolution, are forcing spiritual responses of a certain kind. Unwilled circumstances are taking over past beliefs and having a startling effect upon them. Events, planned and designed by no-one, are altering moral practice in certain fundamental issues. One of these is contraception, and its effect upon the absolutism of the Catholic Church is probably one of the main causes of the extraordinary changes that have taken place in the Church during this decade.

The Pope, one understands, has still to come to a decision about the moral validity of contraception. He has been under criticism for delaying it so long. Sympathetically one can understand the delay; for the decision, when it comes, is likely to be as important as any Papal pronouncement during the history of the Catholic Church. For, whatever the final conclusion might be, and no matter how strong the hierarchical structure of the Church might be in sustaining it, yet nevertheless the results are bound to be dramatic. If Papal authority maintains a virtual ban on contraception there is bound to be passionate heartache and crucial doubt; and if Papal authority is given for removing the ban then critical questions are bound to be asked about all the pain and moral conflict caused in this generation by doubt about it.

And none of this has been brought about by any direct willing on anyone's part; historic events have created the situation.

For the actual doctrine of the Church in its living practical manner, as it affects persons in the very substance of their being, has undergone drastic change in our time — simply by events taking over. Quite apart from the problem of overpopulation in our time, personal situations have revolutionized. Large families are a matter of deep consequence today; they were not, in the same manner, in the past. If what is called restraint is asked for in controlling the size of families then new intense issues have been created between man and woman. The degree of restraint asked for within modern cultural circumstances is something quite different from anything known in the past. This is usually ignored, but it is obvious that it has changed the whole nature of the doctrine in practice. If a Catholic Christian, for instance, is to look for fulfilment in marriage in the conditions of today, and in accordance with traditional doctrine, he is bound to act in a manner and under a discipline never conceived by his ancestors. The traditional doctrine upon which the Pope has now to make up his mind has been changed by the circumstances of history. Environmental conditions, if accepted with responsibility, impose a marital prac-

tice vitally different from anything in the past. These are the circumstances in which the Pope's pronouncement, if it ever comes, will have to be made. The absolutism of the Church is involved in the sense that a decision is being imposed by unanticipated events and not by open-eyed willing on the part of Papal authority. It becomes absurd to ask for unchanging certainty in the Church, as contrasted with change and doubt outside, when change and doubt upon the most fundamental matters are imposed upon the Church. In a vital sense its whole nature has changed; and this is true in varying degrees for most forms of organized religion; the ancient basis is no longer there; and this has been brought about by events not anticipated or willed by anyone.

A similar change has taken place in another fundamental doctrine, that of miracle. The issues here are not of such an intimate emotional kind as those caused by the necessary challenge of contraception; nevertheless they are important. What was fundamental in doctrine a century ago is no longer so, in the same manner. Miracle has become less and less important; it has become less important when applied to the nature of Christ; morality and the very nature of personality have taken over here as the judges of divinity; it would be hard today to find any ultimate defence of the divinity of Christ built upon miracle. Such a defence was a commonplace in the past. At the very least an adjustment has been made, but it is an adjustment; and once again the absolute basis of the Christian Church is in question.

Where can one look for certainty in this world when those who claim to have a knowledge of certainty are so vulnerable? This is one of the fundamental hidden spiritual dilemmas of the day, felt, one must assume, in various ways far outside the bounds of the Christian Church. A spiritual order created in a past environment is failing to include within itself historic events beating upon it from all directions. No wonder there is spiritual ferment.

The challenge of what is now usually called the death of God is being taken up. The cry "God is Dead" was never an atheistical cry, anyway. It contains depths of longing that come from the heart whenever death is felt or faced. It supposes that the God now "dead" was once alive, and that is a supposition of great magnitude; for it raises all the universal issues of life that are created out of death — and men have never run away from those. It may be that, with so much in traditional religion now dead, men are creating once more within the organized religions, and what is perhaps more significant, outside, a new life of religion.

E. G. LEE

TERENCE WHITE GERVAIS : V. V. RAMANA MURTI

In Memoriam : Martin Luther King

[One of the saddest and most significant pieces of violence in this decade of violence was the assassination of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; for here violence turned upon one who was a symbol of the very power that could dissolve and make unnecessary all acts of violence. In honour of his memory we publish below two tributes, one from an English and the other from an Indian contributor.

Mr. Terence White Gervais is well known to our readers for his wise and sympathetic understanding of religion and philosophy and aesthetics, especially Eastern. Shri V. V. Ramana Murti, M.A., M.LITT., is Reader in Political Science at the University of Rajasthan. He has done research on Gandhian non-violence and worked on a project on arms control and disarmament.

May the memory of Dr. King be a reminder to all nations that sanity is possible and that all conflicts can be resolved with love.—ED.]

I

Nor let us weep that our delight is fled
Far from these carrion kites that scream below;
He wakes or sleeps with the enduring dead;
Thou canst not soar where he is sitting now. ...

And he is gathered to the kings of thought
Who waged contention with their time's decay,
And of the past are all that cannot pass away.

—SHELLEY: "Adonais: An Elegy on the Death of John Keats"

IN MEMORIAM: yet, in a never more urgent sense, for the Future, *pro futuro*. The assassination of King has justly been compared with those of his compatriot Kennedy and his *guru* Gandhi; if we compare the records of these three men and the results of their deaths it may well seem that in King's case planning for the future is even more relevant than analysing the past. Kennedy stood heir to the wide and subtle story of Western democracy and the American Presidency; his murder could not vitally affect their survival. Gandhi, heir to an age-long Asian philosophy, had already inspired millions (including King) and his essential labour was over. Whereas Martin Luther King was heir to no comfort, he did not wield Gandhi's or Kennedy's sway; his murder was the bare slaying of truth and love in a naked struggle. Hence the need for the forward glance, to clothe the bare hopelessness of the present, to fulfil a life which itself stood dedicated to the harmony and freedom of man. All of us who believe in the universal society are in King's debt. More than any other Negro leader he reached world rank, even the Nobel Prize; yet, Gandhi and

maybe a few disciples excepted, what national or racial leader has won such rank with so pacific a trumpet, so loving a clarion call? Fame seldom comes in this smiling spirit. It is King's almost unique title that his fame as leader of his people and pleader for their rights blended indissolubly with his passion for peace and love. Partisan demagogy could have been forgiven him; but he preferred the still narrower path, where passion for justice kisses compassion for all mankind. What is remarkable in King, as to a large degree in many leaders in Africa itself, is the *absence* of racialism, the bypassing of Black Power or of any power other than that, alas! elusive, of the human soul. Even his undenied personal magnetism, expressing itself in sonorous Biblical cadence and an almost *flamenco* rhetoric, was geared to peace. In him, passion and compassion truly sang hand in hand. Or else, from a slightly different angle, we may see in him the Buddhist pattern of the jewel of compassion within the hand of practical wisdom. For King was one of those who have best succeeded in the tortuous, tortured task of combining ideal and performance with minimum compromise on either side. Of course, like all others in history, he failed in this Platonic task: small inconsistencies may even be pointed out (as, far more, in his opponents); yet few men have better manoeuvred the elusive tormented need to blend justice and peace, freedom with love, and to counteract the less good by-products, even of an ideal which is essentially good.

Significantly he was perhaps the only figure able to hold together, and command respect from, both violent militants and passive resisters in the Negro ranks; to what extent his moral leadership would have been immersed in the victory of violence cannot now be told; probably two trends will long be evident — an increase in violence due to despair and to a "common-sense" instinct for reprisal, and a halt called to violence, precisely through the shock of King's murder, in the way that Kennedy's death facilitated the passing of a strong Civil Rights bill.

An equally vital question will face America (and indeed the world): can she unite militancy for the coloured cause with understanding compassion for suffering everywhere? King embodied this duality: to those who, in 1966, rejected his opposition to the Viet Nam war as distracting from the Negro cause, he replied: "I cannot segregate my moral concern." Integration, not segregation, lay deep in his nature: even if "most white Americans are unconscious racists" (a view endorsed by the Presidential Commission on Civil Disorders), King early witnessed the exploitation of the poor white as well as of the Negro, and his active compassion flew to the oppressed in every context. No clearer evidence could be found than the present massive march of America's poor on Washington:

> We will place the problems of the poor at the seat of government of the wealthiest nation in the history of mankind. If that power refuses to acknowledge its debt to the poor, it will have failed to live up to its promise to ensure life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to its citizens. If this society fails, I fear that we will learn very shortly that racism is a sickness unto death. ...

Note the absence — till the last six words — of any reference to race or colour as such. Far was his spirit from such simplifications as Stokeley Carmichael's gibe that "white America killed Dr. King." Yet this unprejudiced perception went hand in hand with, and in a curious symbiosis inspired, his quite un-passive activist philosophy. There has been no more cheap and unhappy play on words than the confusion between "pacifism" and "passivity," as if "action" could mean only violence and even war. King recognized both the "pragmatic invalidity of violence" and "its inability to appeal to conscience," while

> non-violence is power, but it is the right and good use of power. ... In the quest for power I cannot bypass the concern for morality. ...
>
> Ultimately a genuine leader is not a searcher for consensus but a moulder of consensus. I said on one occasion, "If every Negro in the United States turns to violence, I will choose to be that lone voice preaching that this is the wrong way."

(He illustrates this by reference to anti-Semitic "consensus" in Nazi Germany.)

The edging paradoxes continue. On the one hand:

> Time is cluttered with the wreckage of individuals and communities that surrendered to violence ...

Yet,

> with every ounce of our energy we must continue to rid our nation of the incubus of racial injustice. But we need not in the process relinquish our privilege and obligation to love.

Yet equally:

> History is the long and tragic story of the fact that privileged groups seldom give up their privileges voluntarily. Individuals may see the moral light and voluntarily give up their unjust posture, but groups are more immoral than individuals.

As for Black Power,

> it talks unceasingly about not imitating the values of white society, but in advocating violence it is imitating the worst, the most brutal and the most uncivilized values of American life.

Yet the frantic-driven youths of the ghettos arouse his comprehending sympathy. For "the daily life of the Negro is still lived in the basement of the Great Society."

Out of the confusions and counter-confusions this involves, Martin Luther King could see both the moral light and the practical march.

TERENCE WHITE GERVAIS

II

THE TRAGIC ASSASSINATION of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. on 4 April 1968 at Memphis has a parallel only in the martyrdom of Mahatma Gandhi on 30 January 1948. That Dr. King, who consistently preached and practised non-violence in the Civil Rights movement in America, was a victim of violence was much more a testimony to the inherent power of the Gandhian ethic than anything else. It may be recalled that it was Gandhi's unilateral insistence on the Hindu-Muslim unity through non-violence that cost him his life. The last phase of Martin Luther King was similarly crowned with a supreme tragedy.

For all the great success of the bus-boycott movement in Montgomery in 1956 and of the civil disobedience in Birmingham in 1963, Dr. King's leadership was recently confronted by the emergence of "Black Power," which seemed to acquire considerable support from the more impatient sections among the Negroes, Dr. King had to contest the advocates of Black Power as well as the White extremists in his mission to promote the Negro Revolution within the framework of non-violence. He repeatedly said that the American house is a common inheritance in which both the White man and the Black man have to live together. This was the dream of Martin Luther King, whom Louis Fischer acclaimed in a speech on 9 March 1965 as the "Gandhi of America."

Gandhi was always interested in the cause of the American Negro. He published an instructive life-sketch of Booker Washington, the famous Negro leader, in the *Indian Opinion* of 10 September 1903, at a time he was fighting against the South African racial discrimination against the Asiatics. He often reiterated his conviction that the non-violent technique might be vindicated more fully by the American Negro. Several Negro leaders like Thurman, Tobias, and Mays from America visited Gandhi for his guidance in their struggle for freedom and justice. Gandhi was deeply moved by the sufferings of the Negroes. He once told an American Negro delegation on 20 February 1936 that "if it comes true, it may be through the Negroes that the unadulterated message of non-violence will be delivered to the world."

Gandhi's prophecy has indeed come true nearly two decades later in America. When a Negro seamstress, Mrs. Rosa Parks, refused to comply with the discriminating seating arrangements in a bus at Montgomery on 1 December 1955, and was consequently arrested, it created a momentous stir that eventually led to the bus-boycott by the entire Negro community in the city. On 5 December 1955, which King called "the day of all days," the bus-boycott began and it was completely successful. The struggle, which was prolonged for nearly one year, ended in the segregation of the buses at Montgomery.

The Montgomery episode was memorable for two things. It produced an eminently worthy leader of a non-violent movement in the person of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. He was then a pastor of Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery. The bus-boycott in Montgomery also systematically evolved a new technique of resisting racial discrimination through the non-violent technique of Gandhi. As Martin Luther King wrote about the Montgomery resistance of the Negroes, "Christ furnished the spirit and motivation while Gandhi furnished the method."

It was left to Dr. King to renew the validity of the whole Gandhian movement for Indian freedom. He always asked the basic question whether we could ignore this example of recent history. And he found congenial soil in Montgomery where he could effectively use the Gandhian method. The Negro church and King's own religious fervour certainly contributed to the powerful appeal of this technique. Here is another parallel with Gandhi, who integrated politics and religion.

Like Gandhi, King had immense reserves of spiritual strength, which he needed greatly as a non-violent leader. The Montgomery experiment revealed the complex forces that would always work in the process of social change. On both sides in the struggle there were occasions of doubt and despair. Under such conditions, either retaliation was advocated or non-violence was criticized. Above all, in a non-violent struggle there is always a demand for some kind of self-sacrifice. Non-violence means going to jail, facing the police, and even meeting the bullet. If Dr. King was sustained in his life-mission, it was because of his deeply religious nature.

Dr. King describes in his Autobiography a rare experience he had gone through. During the bus-boycott at Montgomery, King was assailed by an inner conflict that divided his mind as to the next step in January 1956. He was completely exhausted. Alone, he stood and prayed aloud. In this "dialogue" with God, King recalls his words, "I am here taking a stand for what I believe is right. But now I am at the end of my powers ... where I can't face it alone." Then he continues the story:

> At that moment I experienced the presence of the Divine as I had never

experienced Him before. It seemed as though I could hear the quiet assurance of an inner voice saying: "Stand up for righteousness, stand up for truth, and God will be at your side for ever." Almost at once ... I was ready to face anything.

This was how the Rev. Martin Luther King lived and died. What he confessed here could have well been testified to by Mahatma Gandhi.

Martin Luther King's contribution to the Gandhian technique now belongs to history. His successful application of *Satyāgraha* in Montgomery dispelled the prevalent notion in India and abroad also that the Gandhian technique could operate only in a colony in relation to an imperial power. With Dr. King's leadership of the non-violent struggle of the Negroes, the non-violent technique has acquired an international dimension. The Rev. Martin Luther King is the Saint Paul of Mahatma Gandhi. He extended the Gandhian technique and in doing so he unfolded new aspects of its working.

The most notable is the concept of "creative tension" which Martin Luther King has added to the non-violent terhnique of conflict resolution. Conflict is not to be avoided but always to be confronted. But the confrontation has to be non-violent. This creates a tension that has to be deliberately precipitated through the non-violent direct action. The intensity of such a tension will resolve the conflict peacefully and, for this reason, it is a creative tension. The concept was applied in the civil resistance that Dr. King led in Birmingham in 1963.

When eight clergymen from Alabama questioned the relevance of *Satyāgraha* in Birmingham in an open statement, the Rev. Dr. King answered this charge in an open letter he wrote on 16 April 1963, in prison. He defended his technique of resisting evil through non-violence, and quoted many examples from history to support his contention. He wrote in this famous letter:

> Non-violent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension ... the creation of tension is a part of the work of a non-violent resister ... there is a type of constructive non-violent tension which is necessary for growth ... We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out in the open where it can be seen and dealt with.

In recent years, Dr. King applied this technique of creative tension to throw into bold relief the many sources of racial discrimination. This idea of creative tension was implicit in the Gandhian technique. And Gandhi has made use of it in all his major campaigns. But it was the genius of Dr. King to revive it in the "affluent society" with remarkable relevance.

The Nobel Peace Prize for Dr. Martin Luther King was a timely

recognition of his great services to the cause of the brotherhood of man. It was no less a tribute to Dr. King's non-violence. In his statement of acceptance of the Nobel Award at Oslo on 10 December 1964, Dr. King observed:

> After contemplation I conclude that this award is a profound recognition that non-violence is the answer to the crucial political and moral question of our time — the need for man to overcome oppression and violence without resorting to violence and oppression. Civilization and violence are antithetical concepts ... Negroes of the United States, following the people of India, have demonstrated that non-violence is a powerful moral force which makes for social transformation.

What course the Civil Rights movement takes now, particularly on the question of non-violent technique is a matter of great significance for us all. How the Negro Revolution, which is often characterized as the Second American Revolution, will react to the martyrdom of its most illustrious leader, and the greatest apostle of non-violence in our times, Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., is to be closely watched.

V. V. RAMANA MURTI

THE BEST THING then we can bring to pass, as long as we have no perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to conceive some manner of living aright or certain rules of life, to commit them to memory, and to apply them continuously to the individual things which come in our way frequently in life, so that our imagination may be deeply affected with them and they may be always ready for us. For instance, we placed among the rules of life ... that hatred must be overcome by love or nobleness, not requited by reciprocated hatred. But in order that this rule may be always ready for us when we need it, we must often think and meditate on the common injuries done to men, and in what manner and according to what method they may best be avoided by nobility of character. For if we unite the image of the injury to the image of this rule, it will always be ready for us ... when an injury is done to us.

—SPINOZA

J. N. CHUBB

Indian Philosophy and Social Concern

[Dr. J. N. Chubb has retired after a long career of devoted teaching of philosophy, many years of it at Elphinstone College, Bombay. He presided recently over a session of the Indian Philosophical Congress. A book on Critical Philosophy, the fruit of his meditations in the last few years, is awaiting publication.

For this article he has modified a paper read at a Seminar sponsored by the Madras University. He argues cogently that there is not only no contradiction but even an essential consonance between the transcendent values with which Indian philosophy is chiefly concerned and a vital sense of the importance of ordering this world aright.—ED.]

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY is a term which covers many systems of thought representing divergent points of view which are in some cases inconsistent with each other. I shall confine myself to those systems of Indian philosophy which are metaphysical and whose main concern is with the transcendent value of absolute freedom from the limitations of relative existence. Such systems may be called philosophies of salvation, and though there are doctrinal differences among them, they are all agreed on three important points. They all agree that the Self is other than the body, the senses, and the mind, including the intellect or *buddhi*. Secondly, this Self is unanimously regarded as eternal, not in the weaker sense of persisting for ever, but in the metaphysical sense of being beyond time and change. Lastly, it is agreed by all that this Self is in a state of bondage, actual or apparent, and that the ultimate destiny of the Self is to attain freedom, or realize its essential freedom, and thus for ever pass beyond the sphere of death and suffering. The Self, on this view, is, as I have said, always above the psycho-physical personality and the instruments of the body, senses, and mind, but in freedom it becomes conscious of itself as an independent entity, and, though associated with the personality while the body lasts, is totally unaffected by the vicissitudes and limitations of its outer instruments or the conglomeration of qualities which constitute its personality.

The question now is: What is the relation between a philosophy of salvation, understood in this sense, and a philosophy which is concerned, not with the transcendent value of freedom, but with the relative social values? Are these two incompatible with each other, or if they are consistent, are they merely indifferent to each other, or can they be brought together into the unity of an integral philosophy which is not merely interested in the pursuit of two kinds of values, freedom and social con-

cern, but in unifying these two outlooks in such a way that each becomes organic to the other, and that the pursuit of freedom is regarded, not as an end in itself, but as a preparation for the fulfilment of a deeper and wider purpose underlying the process of evolution and the fact of embodied and collective existence?

The first question I would like to deal with is: Is an other-than-worldly attitude incompatible with the promotion of values within the world, that is, in a world of embodied human beings living together in society? Does the emphasis on salvation and a supernatural destiny deny the values of a life "in nature" and suppress or curtail the fullness and the joy of living under conditions of relative existence?

This question may be answered either on the basis of historical evidence or from a consideration of human nature and the normal laws of its working.

Considered from the historical point of view I think it may be said that, in India at any rate, the emphasis on the supreme importance of the other-than-worldly ideal has not, in any way, inhibited the richness and the joy of life in diverse spheres of human activity.

Even if we consider the question psychologically, there is no *a priori* reason to assert that the emphasis on the Transcendence as the fulfilment of all *puruṣārthas* must result in a neglect or impoverishment of those forms of life whose aims, however lofty, are still in the main terrestrial.

There is hence good evidence for the view that a philosophy of salvation is compatible with social concern and the flowering of a many-sided expression of life.

It is, however, important to recognize that whatever may have been true of the past, in the India of today there is a noted lack of harmony and balance between the exalted precepts of transcendent Wisdom derived from the Upaniṣads, the *Gītā*, and the systems of Vedānta, and the actual structure of society with its many indefensible features of social life which are imperfect, ugly, and degrading.

Whatever the causes of national decay in this country, I believe that there is nothing whatever in the spirit and teachings of Indian philosophy which provides contributory causes for the fall into inertia and apathy. It is possible, by placing a popular and superficial interpretation on some doctrines of spiritual philosophy, or, by grossly misunderstanding and caricaturing them, to show that they lead to such negative and anti-social attitudes as fatalism, callousness, and apathy in the presence of social injustice and wide-spread evil. But these criticisms reveal aberrations in the understanding of the critics rather than inherent defects in the teaching criticized. Hence, if our task is to place an ever-increasing emphasis

on humanism and the ideal of social welfare and the all-round enrichment of our cultural life, this task can well be undertaken without any reform and reorientation of the basic teachings concerning Reality, Man, and his ultimate destiny which we find in Indian philosophy.

There is even a more positive and creative role which the basic doctrines and ideals of the Indian way of life have to play in the great task of social and political reorganization.

A nation is not merely a collection of individuals, or a geographical expression. I believe with Vivekananda that there is such a thing as a national *svadharma,* a characteristic mode of living and thinking, or an organization of the complex social structure in the light of a fundamental guiding principle to which the people belonging to the nation must, as a whole, remain loyal, or else see the nation decline or even perish.

India's social system rests on the orientation of all her energies and the multifarious forms of self-expression of her national life to the search for the Eternal in which man finds his true self and his absolute freedom. That is our national *svadharma,* and it is by holding on to this that we, as a nation, have managed to survive and can reasonably look forward to an indefinite future of progress and increasing prosperity.

According to Sri Aurobindo the spiritual motive will be in the future of India, as in her past, the real originative and dominating strain.

> India's social system [he says] is built upon this conception [of the Eternal, the Spirit here encased in matter]; her philosophy formulates it; her religion is an aspiration to the spiritual consciousness and its fruits; her art and literature have the same upward look; her whole *dharma* or law of being is founded upon it. ... And it is her fidelity, with whatever human shortcomings, to this highest ideal that has made her people a nation apart in the human world.

It is therefore necessary to face the task of social reform and the revitalization of the national life bearing in mind our national *svadharma.* The danger to be avoided is the blind acceptance of the techniques and the framework of values embedded in the pragmatic approach which comes to us from the West, on the specious grounds that, since the Western nations are far ahead of us economically, industrially, educationally, and in the organization of social services, the "backward" nations of the world must follow closely in their footsteps even to the extent of repeating the mistakes they have made and adopting the methods which they themselves have outgrown.

It should be emphasized that remaining loyal to *svadharma* does not mean closing the door to progress and change. While it cannot be denied that a crippling orthodoxy has become embedded in the national life, we

must realize that it is only there as a blemish and a wound, which have to be removed and healed. Such defects find no support and derive no strength from the central philosophical and spiritual ideas and ideals that have been the guiding forces of our civilization. On the contrary, it is in consonance with our *svadharma,* whose outstanding characteristic is the spirit of inquiry and exploration, that there should be constant attempts at self-renewal, at reformation and revitalization of the outer structure of which the spiritual orientation is the unifying principle.

Our task, however, is not merely to preserve our heritage, but, in a large measure, to fall back upon it precisely for the purpose of growing out towards a greater future. We have many and very pressing problems which require an all-out attempt for their solution, but it would be a mistake to import, at second hand, the solutions of these problems from the West. The solution must come from within and develop out of our own inner resources. It must, in consonance with our national genius, be a characteristically Indian solution. To quote Sri Aurobindo again:

> India must defend herself by reshaping her cultural forms to express more powerfully, intimately and perfectly her ancient ideal. [And again] ... all we do or create must be consistent with the abiding spirit of India, but framed to fit into a greater harmonized rhythm and plastic to the call of a more luminous future. ... There cannot be a healthy and victorious survival if we make of the past a fetish instead of an inspiring impulse ...

So far I have spoken of the regeneration of our national life in relation to the system of values embedded in our philosophical culture. But there is, as I mentioned in the early part of my paper, a deeper aspect to the problem of philosophy and social concern on which I shall now touch briefly. This concerns, not merely an increased attention to our practical mundane interests and the application of spiritual values to the outward forms of individual and social life, but the deepening of the significance of the spiritual life itself and the widening of its horizons with "vistas on the evolutionary potentialities of the earth's coming ages."

Though emphasis on the transcendent ideal of freedom has not only co-existed with cultural life but even provided an invigorating impulse, there is, in the last resort, an inevitable tension between these two aspects of life which can only be resolved if the ideal of a world-negating salvation is replaced by a greater world-affirming spiritual ideal in which mind values, life values, and even the values of material existence are accounted for and given their own characteristic mode of fulfilment.

The Platonic-Aristotelian-Scholastic view of culture as the necessary social discipline which subserves the higher ends of the spiritual life and is a mere preparation for the order of contemplation or scale of ascent to

it must be replaced by a more integral view which sees in the forms of cultural life seeds of their own divine fulfilment.

In traditional Indian thought and, in fact, in all religions and philosophies of salvation, the ultimate destiny of man is supernatural. It is freedom from death and suffering or sin and a rising into Life Everlasting in the realization of an intimate, timeless relation, a union or identification, with the Transcendent. The world of time, change, and relations in a society whose units are embodied individuals has, in the last analysis, to be abandoned. If one extends the concept of *Māyā* to refer, not necessarily to the illusoriness of the manifold, but to the ultimate "abandonment" of the values of relative existence, then it would, I think, be true to say that Māyāvāda is the key-note, the logical corollary, of all religious and spiritual philosophies up to the time of Sri Aurobindo. "India," says Sri Aurobindo, "has not spoken her last creative word. The Immemorial *Shakti* has yet to discover the complete and a vaster form of her *Dharma*."

I shall, in conclusion, make a few points in connection with these two contrasting attitudes: the world-abandoning attitude of the philosophies of salvation and the world-saving attitude which is emphasized in the integral vision of Sri Aurobindo's philosophy.

First, let me explain what I mean by "world" in the two phrases, "world-abandoning" and "world-saving." By "world" I mean individual and collective existence in the body to which time is, in some sense, real and which is a working out of an evolutionary possibility contained in the Divine Ground of all existence. Salvation, as ordinarily understood, is an individual affair, and the world, in the sense explained above, is left behind when the self attains the summit of existence and is delivered from delusion and suffering.

The statement that the ultimate ideal is not merely individual salvation, but salvation for all, *lokasaṅgraha,* none the less still refers to a world-abandoning ideal; for it means the rise of all beings into some Heaven or *Nirvāṇa* which is transcendent to this world and not a bringing of the Divine into the field of manifestation and realizing the inmost potentialities of the manifested order as such. It is not concerned with the eradication of evil, ugliness, and suffering from embodied existence and the network of human relations and bringing into existence a harmonized spiritual society which will reflect within its structure the principle of a divine order.

Sri Aurobindo's conception of the transformation rather than the abandonment of Nature and of the emergence of a new society in which spiritual values do not merely exercise a partial, but on the whole, an ineffective influence, but permeate every stratum of existence and every

aspect of human relations, both among individuals and among nations, is the formulation of the divine intention behind manifestation, an intention secretly held in the inconscient base of the evolutionary process. It cannot be said to be quite definitely a part of the tradition of Indian philosophy, nor would it be right to say that it falls wholly outside it. Though it adds a new dimension to the philosophies of salvation, it is yet, in a sense, continuous with the spirit and tradition of Indian philosophy. It is a deepening and widening of what is essentially the same standpoint. The thought is still anchored in the Supreme and all-pervading Spirit, while, at the same time, it overcomes the sharp oppositions between non-dualism, semi-non-dualism, and dualism, treating them as complementary aspects of an integral whole, and also denies the denial that is attendant on the first stage of spiritual philosophy, reconciling the extreme terms of existence, Spirit and Matter, and bringing about a spiritual completeness, not by a flight into the Transcendent, but by a victorious conquest of material nature through the descent of Divine Light and Power into our earthly members.

J. N. CHUBB

MY DEVOTEE who is free from enmity, well-disposed towards all creatures, merciful, wholly exempt from pride and selfishness, the same in pain and pleasure, patient of wrongs, contented, constantly devout, self-governed, firm in resolves, and whose mind and heart are fixed on me alone, is dear unto me. He also is my beloved of whom mankind is not afraid and who has no fear of man; who is free from joy, from despondency and the dread of harm. My devotee who is unexpecting, pure, just, impartial, devoid of fear, and who hath forsaken interest in the results of action, is dear unto me. He also is worthy of my love who neither rejoiceth nor findeth fault, who neither lamenteth nor coveteth, and being my servant hath forsaken interest in both good and evil results. He also is my beloved servant who is equal-minded to friend or foe, the same in honour and dishonour, in cold and heat, in pain and pleasure, and is unsolicitous about the event of things; to whom praise and blame are as one; who is of little speech, content with whatever cometh to pass, who hath no fixed habitation, and whose heart, full of devotion, is firmly fixed.

—*Bhagavad-Gītā*

B. C. LAW

The Essence of Jain Religion and Philosophy

[We print below the second and concluding part of Dr. B. C. Law's thorough survey of the teachings of the *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*.—ED.]

II

MAHAVIRA has given instructions regarding exertion in righteousness. Those who believe in it, accept it, practise it, comply with it, study it, and understand it, have obtained perfection, enlightenment, deliverance, and final beatitude.

A person becomes free from sins by abstaining from slaying life, falsehood, theft, and sexual indulgence. He becomes free from sins by possessing the five *samitis* and the three *guptis*, by freedom from passions, by subduing the senses, by conquering conceit, and by avoiding delusions.[16]

Study is fivefold: Saying or learning one's lesson, questioning the teacher about it, repetition, pondering, and religious discourse.

One should not meditate on painful and sinful things; one should meditate on the law or norm with a collected mind. This is meditation. If a monk remains motionless while lying down, sitting, or standing upright, this is called abandoning of the body, which is one of the internal austerities.[17]

One should practise self-control. Attachment and hatred are two evils which produce bad *karma*. If a monk always avoids them, he will not be subject to transmigration. A monk who always avoids the thrice threefold hurtful, conceited, and delusive acts will not be subject to transmigration.

By the teaching of true knowledge, by the avoidance of ignorance and delusion, and by the destruction of attachment and hatred one arrives at deliverance, which is nothing but bliss.

There are eight kinds of *karma*: (1) that which acts as an obstruction to right knowledge (*jñānāvaraṇīya*); (2) that which acts as an obstruction to right faith (*darśanāvaraṇīya*); (3) that which leads to pain or pleasure (*vedanīya*); (4) that which leads to delusion (*mohanīya*); (5) that which determines the length of life (*āyuḥkarma*); (6) that which determines the name or individuality of the embodied soul; (7) that which determines *gotra* or family name; and (8) that which prevents a person from entering the path leading to eternal bliss (*antarāya*).[18] Karma is the deed of the soul. It is a material forming a subtle bond of extremely refined *karmic* matter which keeps the soul confined to its place of origin or the natural abode of full knowledge and everlasting peace.

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[16] *Ibid.*, XXX [17] *Ibid.*, XXX. 35-36 [18] *Uttarādhyayana*, XXXIII. 1-3

Obstruction to knowledge is fivefold: (*a*) obstruction to knowledge derived from the sacred books (*śruta*); (*b*) obstruction to perception (*ābhinibodhika*); (*c*) obstruction to supernatural knowledge (*avadhijñāna*); (*d*) obstruction to knowledge of the thoughts of other people (*manaḥparyāya*); (e) obstruction to the highest, unlimited knowledge (*kevala*).

The first kind of knowledge corresponds to what the Buddhists call *sutamayapaññā*; the second kind, to what they call *cintāmayapaññā*; the third kind, to what they call *vilokana*; the fourth kind, to what they call *cetopariyāñāṇa*; and the fifth kind, to what they call *sabbaññuta* or omniscience, consisting in three faculties: of reviewing and recalling to mind all past existences with details, of perceiving the destiny of other beings according to their deeds, and of being conscious of the final destruction of sins.[19] *Kevala* means that which is limited by the object, that which is sufficient to survey the field of observation.[20] *Manaḥparyāyajñāna* is defined in the *Ācārāṅga Sūtra* (II. 15. 23) as a knowledge of the thoughts of all sentient beings. *Kevalajñāna* is defined in the same text as omniscience enabling a person to comprehend all objects and to know all conditions of the worlds of gods, men, and demons (II. 15. 25).

The following are the different kinds of obstruction to right faith: sleep, activity, very deep sleep, a high degree of activity, a state of deep-rooted greed. *Vedanīya* is twofold: pleasure and pain. *Mohanīya* is twofold as referring to faith and conduct. The three kinds of *Mohanīya* referring to faith are right faith, wrong faith, and faith partly right and partly wrong. The two kinds of *Mohanīya* referring to conduct are what is experienced in the form of the four cardinal passions and what is experienced in the form of feelings different from them.[21] *Āyuṣka* is fourfold: denizens of hell, brute creation, men, and gods. *Nāma* is twofold: good and bad. *Gotra* is twofold: high and low. *Antarāya* is fivefold as preventing gifts, profits, momentary enjoyment, continuous enjoyment, and power. The number of atoms of every *karma* is infinite. The *karma* in the six directions of space binds all souls. The six directions of space are the four cardinal points. The number of perfected souls is infinite.[22]

The *leśyās* are different conditions produced in the soul by the influence of different *karmas*. They are, therefore, not dependent on the nature of the soul, but on the *karma* which accompanies the soul. They are named in the following order: black, blue, grey, red, yellow, and white. *Leśyā* is said to be that by means of which the soul is tinted with merit and demerit. It arises from *yoga* or *kaṣāya*, namely, the vibrations due to

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[19] Cf. *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, i. 9

[20] Cf. *Kalpasūtra*, 15

[21] *Uttarādhyayana*, XXXIII. 5-10

[22] *Ibid.*, XXXIII. 12-18, 24

the activity of body or mind or speech or passion. According to Leumann it means "soul type."

The Buddhist idea of contamination of mind by the influx of impurities from outside, illustrated by the simile of a piece of cloth dyed blue, red, yellow, or the like, would seem to have some bearing on the Jain doctrine of the six *leśyās,* which is merely hinted at in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (I. 4, 21), where a Jain saint is described as a person whose soul is in a pure condition, and fully explained in the *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* (XXXIV). Religious efforts are directed towards the acquisition of pure *leśyā.*[23]

The black *leśyā* has the colour of a rain-cloud, a buffalo's horn. The blue *leśyā* has the colour of the blue *aśoka* (*Jonesia aśoka*) having red flowers. The grey *leśyā* has the colour of the flower of *atasī* (*Linum usitatissimum*) having blue flowers. The red *leśyā* has the colour of vermilion. The yellow *leśyā* has the colour of orpiment. The white *leśyā* has the colour of conch-shell. The taste of the black *leśyā* is more bitter than that of *tumbaka* (*Lagenaria vulgaris*). The taste of the blue *leśyā* is more pungent than black pepper and dry ginger. The taste of the grey *leśyā* is sourer than that of unripe mango. The taste of the red *leśyā* is more pleasant than that of ripe mango. The taste of the yellow *leśyā* is better than that of excellent wine and various liquors, honey, and *maireyaka.* The taste of the white *leśyā* is better than that of dates, grapes, milk, and pounded sugar. The degrees of the *leśyās* are three or nine or twenty-seven or eighty-one or two hundred and forty-three. Each of these degrees is threefold: low, middle, and high. A man who acts on the impulse of the five sins, who commits cruel acts, who is wicked and mischievous, develops the black *leśyā.* A man who has anger, ignorance, hatred, wickedness, deceit, greed, carelessness, love of enjoyment, etc., develops the blue *leśyā.* A man who is dishonest in words and acts, a heretic, a deceiver, a thief, etc., develops the grey *leśyā.* A man who controls himself, who is attentive to his study and duties, develops the yellow *leśyā.* A man who controls himself, who abstains from constant thinking about his misery, who is free from passion, who is calm, and who subdues his senses develops the white *leśyā.* The black, blue, and grey *leśyās* are the lowest *leśyās*; through them the soul is brought into miserable courses of life. The red, yellow, and white *leśyās* are the good *leśyās*; through them the soul is brought into happy courses of life. In the first and last moment of all these *leśyās,* when they are joined with the soul, the latter is not born into a new existence.[24]

There are ten conditions for the realization of celibacy. By hearing and knowing them the monks will reach a high degree of self-discipline.

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[23] *Sūtrakṛtāṅga,* I. 10,15 [24] *Uttarādhyayana,* XXXIV

of contemplation, of stopping sins by means of the *samitis* and *guptis*. will be well protected, will guard their senses and chastity. There are five *samitis* and three *guptis* which constitute eight means of self-control.[25] The *samitis*[26] are the following: (1) going by paths trodden by men, beasts, carts, etc. and looking carefully so as not to cause the death of living beings; (2) gentle, sweet, and righteous speech; (3) receiving alms in a manner to avoid forty-two possible faults; (4) receiving and keeping things necessary for religious exercises; and (5) performing the operations of nature in an unfrequented place. The three *guptis*[27] are the following: (1) preventing the mind's dwelling on sensual pleasures by engaging it in contemplation, study, etc.; (2) preventing the tongue from saying bad things by a vow of silence; (3) putting the body in an immovable posture.

A monk is holy through his innocence. He allows no troubles to influence his words, thoughts, and acts. He should take no notice of the seductive pleasures and endeavour to shake off delusion. Knowing the highest law, he should perform his religious duties. He should be free from attachment and earnest in the performance of austerities.

Begging is a hard task. It is painful never to take anything but what is freely given. There are some tender affections which monks cannot easily overcome.

The disciplinary aspect comprehends the rules of life conducive to reaching the goal set before it. It was chiefly in and through the life of the monk or mendicant that it was sought to fulfil the ideal of conduct. The *sūtras* mostly contain the rules, prescriptions, or restrictive orders laid down for the guidance of the disciples aspiring to lead an ideal life.

It is interesting to note that sufferings in hell as described in Buddhist and Jain books are almost identical. Neither in the Buddhist nor in the Brahmanical system, and in fact in no Indian religious system, is there any conception of eternal, never-ending suffering in hell, like the Christian or rather the Hebrew eschatological conception of *Gehenna*, the abode of the wicked where they suffer endless torments by fire. This is quite foreign to the Indian conception, according to which, every act either good or bad, produces happiness or suffering only for a limited period, though the period may be considerably long according to the nature of the deed.

B. C. LAW

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[25] Cf, *Dīgha.*, I. p. 172 [26] Cf. *Dīgha.*, II, p. 292

[27] Cf. *Vaciguti*, in Asoka's Rock Edict, XII; *Dhammapada*, verse 375; Cf. *Aṅguttara*, IV, 106ff.; *Dīgha.*, III. 148

"THOMAS"

Wealth in Ideas

["Thomas" is the pseudonym of a young writer interested in education whose main concern is to relate the ancient mystical religions to modern culture — which is neither religious nor mystical! In this essay he attempts to describe by means of an interesting analogy the main stimulus to good philosophy— the greed for ideas.

"Thomas" uses the term "ideas" to mean abstract concepts as distinguished from experience of the realities to which they refer. This is certainly a distinction important in spiritual life, which is always trying to get beyond theories to living experience. But *Jñāna* rightly understood is a matter of living experience, not simply of abstract concepts. One might even say that *Jñāna* is concerned with entering into the reality of "ideas" in another sense — those aspects of cosmic consciousness which maintain the realities to be experienced. As Indian tradition has it, the Universe is maintained by *Saṅkalpa,* ideation.—ED.]

THE *Jñāna-yogi,* the man who seeks the truth through intellect and intuition, can be quite miserly about his ideas, hoarding them, gloating over them, and dwelling on them incessantly. It is well known for him to sit up past midnight reckoning his wealth and pondering on the ways of increasing his capital; he never gives any away, but always invests it so that he may reap the dividends. Only when his income is secure can he be philanthropic.

For ideas are the riches of the intellect, and the coins of intellectual commerce. Just as we need hard cash to buy our food and clothes, so we need strong ideas to feed and fortify our minds. This analogy between mental and material cash is instructive; indeed, for the *Jñāni,* the demand for intellectual food can take precedence over his need for bodily food.

Money has no worth *in itself,* but only in relation to the *things* (the consumer durables and perishables) that it can be exchanged for in the market. Coins and notes are invaluable boons because we can barter them for a great variety of different items depending on our immediate needs and purposes. Similarly, ideas have no value apart from the *empirical reality* to which they relate. A sentence on its own is just a sequence of sounds, a collection of words. Words are symbols of the universals and abstractions we use to define and communicate. The *meaning* of a sentence (e.g., "The cat sat on the mat") depends on the perceptions and their relations which give rise to the concepts (e.g., "catness") symbolized by the words of the sentence (e.g., "cat"). (The meaning of this sentence thus depends on our perceiving catness upon matness.) *Ideas* are just those *concepts* which have great importance to our plans and de-

sires, as distinct from mere *descriptions* which have no relation to our wills. ("The cat sat on the mat" is an idea if we are wondering how we can reclaim our favourite armchair; otherwise it is a description.) It is for this reason that an idea which strikes us has such a catalytic effect on our mental mechanics; a good idea stimulates our purposeful interests and throws our minds into high gear. It is not faith that moves mountains, but interest, and dogmas do not cause revolutions — ideas do.

Ideas in sentence form are *propositions,* and have the interesting characteristic that they can be written on postcards, say, and these notes are then comparable to bank-notes, with a similar range of values (from ("Evil is self-destroying" to "Bleacho washes for you"). It is this paper money that we collect!

Schopenhauer has also expressed these notions: "Our intellect is like a bank of issue which, if it is to be sound, must have ready money in the safe, in order to be able, on demand, to meet all the notes it has issued; the perceptions are the ready money, the concepts are the notes."

Just as money has to be earned (the goods which it symbolizes must be made and wanted), so ideas must always be created on the empirical front (they must be relevant to our situation). Money is borrowed, invested, exchanged, paid out, converted into goods; the same with ideas. Just as one man becomes rich in accumulated wealth, so another becomes rich in integrated ideas.

After all our basic needs have been satisfied, cash left over is spare and is known as *capital.* It is used to create things of lasting benefit and advantage, such as dynamos and dams. Once we have used words for our elementary needs, we can invest our capital of ideas in more concrete and beneficial forms — our books. Books are like machines and other capital investments. You have to put fuel into machines and operate them to get results; you have to study books and relate them to be influenced. Just as a machine will produce the goods for years after it has been invented, so books can be influential long after they have been written. It depends in both cases on the efficiency of the instrument and the worth of the products. If books are our means of storing and comparing ideas, then libraries are our banks.

Now just as we need all sorts of things of different values in our daily lives, from boots to diamond engagement rings, so we need all sorts of experiences to keep us intellectually alive — from cabbage-cooking to the profoundest insights into life. Our cheques and bank-notes are easily exchanged into smaller denominations according to our needs; so too our ideas must be readily exchangeable into a range of values. It is as much use taking a high philosophical idea into the kitchen as asking the baker

to change a ten-pound note on a Monday morning.

Books such as Śaṅkara's *Crest Jewel of Discrimination* show this (the title is significant): the one basic idea repeated many times, although it may be of extreme value, is like the one-million-pound note — it cannot readily be cashed. Valuable in a different way are books such as Shaw's *Intelligent Woman's Guide* or Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World Revisited,* which not only have rich theses, but translate them into high-power ideas on every page. They have a wealth of ideas, readily convertible into cash, and we can earn it simply by reading their work. Then again, many books have ideas of varying value, gold nuggets among piles of luncheon vouchers, so to speak, e.g., Colin Wilson's *The Outsider.* (Many books later, his *Beyond the Outsider* is a much more impressive and major work, thick with ideas packed in tight.)

One can draw out the analogy even further. Against the international gold-standard (i.e., universal world-experience) the currencies of each different country can be interchanged. Then we can have old coins and newly minted ones, and we can have devaluation, inflation, forgeries ... . The calculating machine we use for reckoning our pence as well as our pounds is our *logic,* in itself an empty framework, taking its value from the ideas manipulated. *Lucidity* is the smooth functioning of this machine.

This is all very well, yet there is one important point we must not overlook. And that is this: ideas are not themselves the *food* of the mind, they are only the cash which purchases the food. *The actual sustenance of mental life is experience and perception utilized for our own ends.* Ideas enable us to expand our experiences, intensify our purposes (and the *Jñāni,* remember, thirsts for the truth), and give experience greater significance with respect to these, to see a few more of the amazingly varied facets of any particular things, and *drink deep of the immediacy of reality.* There is more than enough food around at any moment, and our ideas allow us to nourish ourselves on it.

If we stick only to ideas, we starve intellectually, which is the fate of the scholar blinking his way home from the library; whereas, if we stick only to our experiences, we shall not be able to do anything with them. Above all, we shall not be able to communicate them, or be influenced by any of the great minds of the past and present who are so rich in ideas for the picking.

"THOMAS"

PREMA NANDAKUMAR

Carl Sandburg: An Appreciation

[Dr. Prema Nandakumar is well known to our readers for her wide range of literary sympathies. In this article she sketches the poetic thought and quality of the late Carl Sandburg against the background of the plight of modern man which so moved him.—ED.]

CARL SANDBURG concluded the Preface to his *Complete Poems* (1950) with these words:

> It could be, in the grace of God, I shall live to be eighty-nine, as did Hokusai, and speaking my farewell to earthly scenes, I might paraphrase: "If God had let me live five years longer I should have been a writer."

The poet proved a quaint soothsayer, for he died in his ninetieth year recently; after, however, having achieved great distinction as a writer. His had been a rich life, a life of labour and fulfilment. He was born in 1878 at Galesburg, Illinois, where his parents lived. They were poor Swedish immigrants, but Carl had an abundance of affection in the homestead. He had to take up employment at the age of thirteen, though, and he seems to have acquiesced in this cheerfully enough, and was soon through a variety of jobs — milkman, cornhusker, dishwasher, porter, brickmaker, salesman, and house painter. In his twenty-first year he went to Puerto Rico to take part in the Spanish-American War and became the war-correspondent for the Galesburg *Evening Mail.* After a year he returned to the States and managed to get a taste of collegiate education. His marriage to Lillian Steichen in 1908 proved a blessing and he gradually settled down to a writing career. By the time he passed away, he had turned out an amazing amount of creative writing. Poetry was his passport to fame; nevertheless, he was equally famous for his collections of American popular ballads, his stories and poems for children, the massive biography of Abraham Lincoln which won him the Pulitzer Prize, and journalist commentaries in *Storm Over the Land* (1942) and *Home Front Memo* (1943). He was also the author of a novel, *Remembrance Rock,* that tantalizingly mixes fiction, history, reportage, and commentary.

Sandburg is without demur usually included in the fine gallery of modern American poets. He is also among the most popular of these, because he uses the common idiom of the people around him. He is not a difficult poet; indeed, it is a pleasure to relax with his poems, because they aim at simple description and spontaneous lyricism. Eschewing the subtler concepts of philosophy and the solemn notes of earlier poets like Walt Whitman, Sandburg sings of the world of man — the world beauti-

fied and threatened by nature, the world where the ripened corn is paralleled by the burnished steel, where cornhuskers look across industrial workers, where the dignity of man is constantly put to the test, and by a strange inner strength man rises to the occasion and holds on. Sandburg began with the activities of everyday life in his *Chicago Poems,* his first collection, published in 1916. The very first poem, "Chicago," is a sub-realistic portrait of the teeming city. Sandburg addresses the city in his characteristic vein — abrupt, almost brazen:

> Hog Butcher for the world,
> Tool Maker, stacker of wheat,
> Player with Railroads and the
> Nation's Freight Handler;
> Stormy, husky, brawling,
> City of the Big Shoulders.

The details are universal, as though Sandburg were describing Calcutta or Bombay or any modern city. A poet's pity, however, is hidden under the brutality of the word-badinage:

> And they tell me you are brutal and my reply is:
> On the faces of women and children I have seen
> the marks of wanton hunger.

The poet's pity proudly accepts man's triumph over his circumstances, as when he watches a "tall bold slugger" working at his job, "flinging magnetic curses":

> Fierce as a dog with tongue lapping for action,
> cunning as a savage pitted against the
> wilderness,
> Bareheaded,
> Shovelling,
> Wrecking,
> Planning,
> Building, breaking, rebuilding,
> Under the smoke, dust all over his mouth,
> laughing with white teeth ...

The poetry of Sandburg's pen triumphs when the worker, prematurely aged because of his toil, laughs "as a young man laughs." It is the sort of laughter that drowns the terrors and tragedies lurking in a worker's life. Other poems in this collection touched upon a variety of subjects — nature, trench life, and the new technology.

Cornhuskers (1918) was wholly about the American rural scene. Farmhand imagery allies itself with technological imagery and produces a

curiously old-new rhythm. Already Sandburg's poems are full of the smoke and the steel of modern life that are pressing upon the age of the prairie, the cornhusker, the wilderness, and Buffalo Bill. *Smoke and Steel* (1920) sounds like an angry young man's love-hate relationship with *kaliyuga,* the age of iron:

> A bar of steel — it is only
> Smoke at the heart of it, smoke and the blood of a man.
> A runner of fire ran in it, ran out, ran somewhere else,
> And left — smoke and the blood of a man
> And the finished steel, chilled and blue.

The age of steel is admirable, with its vast structures and incredible achievements. But it is the birth of a "terrible beauty" that has annihilated the freshness of nature, the innocence of the view and the individuality of man. There is a "disappointment" in the air, a soul-weariness. Sandburg seems to catch it in all its despair and aridity:

> All I can give you is broken-face gargoyles.
> It is too early to sing and dance at funerals,
>
> Though I can whisper to you I am looking for
> an undertaker humming a lullaby and
> throwing his feet in a swift and mystic buck-
> and-wing, now you see it and now you don't.

The poet's youth is getting exhausted. Death becomes a favourite word, and its associations form the imagery for the other poems in this collection. "Death Snips Proud Men" is the title of a poem. In another poem, an Eliotesque casualness reveals a fissure that cannot be explained away:

> The woman named Tomorrow
> sits with a hairpin in her teeth
> and takes her time
> and does her hair the way she wants it
> and fastens at last the last braid and coil
> and puts the hairpin where it belongs
> and turns and drawls: well, what of it?
> My grandmother, Yesterday, is gone.
> What of it? Let the dead be dead.

Though Sandburg would fain conclude his collection thus, and he even endeavours to insinuate a note of *shantih* in the poem "For You," the infection of despair is too far gone. It gangrenes the poem on peace also by concluding thus:

> The peace of great ghosts be for you,
> Phantoms of night-gray eyes, ready to go
> To the fog-star dumps, to the fire-white doors.

Yes, the peace of great phantoms be for you,
Phantom iron men, mothers of bronze,
Keepers of the lean clean breeds.

Snaps of the American scene make up Carl Sandburg's *Slabs of the Sunburnt West* (1922). Though descriptive, the poet is never too far away from his favourite theme — the tragedy of annihilation:

Civilizations, all the work of the artists,
inventors, dreamers of work and genius,
go to the dumps one by one.

Be silent about it; since at the gates of tombs
silence is a gift, be silent; since at the epitaphs
written in the air, since at the swan songs hung in
the air, silence is a gift, be silent; forget it.

The most significant collection of Sandburg is certainly *The People, Yes* (1936). With the thirties came the Great Depression. Reality seemed to have turned against the people themselves in a swift, vengeful mood. Sandburg's title blazons his faith in the people, who would yet triumph over the current clogging circumstances. The collection is full of veiled advice and exhortation:

A tough will counts. So does desire.
So does a rich soft wanting.

How else triumph over the depression around man? And over a life that repeatedly demands sacrifices through death and disaster, war and cunning? The ultimate sufferers are the people, yes; is there a way of escape, then? None! Sandburg becomes almost incoherent in his rage. The long prose-poems in this collection are punched with an acrid humour, that makes the rage all the hotter in expression:

Yes, get Lady Luck with you and you're made: some fortunes were tumbled into and the tumblers at first said, who would have believed it? and later, I knew just how to do it.

Yes, Lady Luck counts: before you're born pick the right papa and mama and the newsreel boys will be on the premises early for a shot of you with your big toe in your mouth.

There is a rawness about Sandburg's choice of words that seems to hit us between the eyes:

The people is a tragic and comic two-face:
hero and hoodlum: phantom and gorilla
twisting to moan with a gargoyle mouth: "They
buy me and sell me ... it's a game ...
sometime I'll break loose ..."

At some rare moments, man, tyrannized over by circumstance, can be jerked into the awareness and contemplation of his own self. The poet's voice proffers a helping hand towards this self-awareness. Carl Sandburg himself admits that such is the poet's task: "All around us the imponderable and the unfathomed — at these targets many a poet has shot his bullets of silver and scored a bull's-eye, or missed with dull pellets of paper." The work of the poet is not only made of crystals formed out of experience; he is also prophetic because of the acute sensibility he develops. Such prophetic gleams are described by Sandburg as "exalted brooding." Sandburg has indeed built his fame upon rock because of these twin qualities of a realistic approach to life and pauses of exalted brooding. While he is apparently dealing with the many sides of the prairie, there is a pause; then:

> I tell you there is nothing in the world,
> only an ocean of tomorrows,
> a sky of tomorrows.

Or, a beginning to a poem trying to fathom the riddle of "freedom":

> Freedom is a habit
> and a coat worn
> some born to wear it
> some never to know it.

Or, when he resolves an apparent contradiction by descriptive reasoning:

> To live big is good:
> to deny much is good too.
> You would have a bag of gold:
> you might ask a sack of peanuts.
> Be full, not so full, go hungry,
> Life is all time yes no yes no.

One of Sandburg's "nine tentative definitions of poetry" runs thus: "Poetry is a series of explanations of life, fading off into horizons too swift for explanations." However, a great poet knows that prosaic explanation of man's circumstances will be of no use. History does the job accurately, though vainly. The poet's "exalted brooding" causes the reader or listener to brood as well. There is a reference to the circumstances, no more. The rest of a poem is an evocation of man's condition in those circumstances through an accurate connecting link. Sandburg's famous war-poem in *Cornhuskers* can be cited as an example. It is 1918, and the war has ended. The poem begins tensely:

Pile the bodies high at Austerlitz and Waterloo.
Shovel them under and let me work —
I am the grass; I cover all.

The living are too few and too powerless to bury decently the many dead in the wars. This crime of meaningless killing — the animal-like law of the jungle — is nothing new for the grass. Thus Sandburg:

And pile them high at Gettysburg
And pile them high at Ypres and Verdun.
Shovel them under and let me work.
Two years, ten years, and passengers ask the conductor:

What place is this?
Where are we now?

The brief poem ends with:

I am the grass.
Let me work.

For the past is not past as yet, in one sense; men will continue to kill each other, and so the situation is hopeless for peace. At any rate, the grass will never find its occupation gone.

The poem is no doubt a naturalistic description of a place of action. There is a bit of history and a hint of the future. It is not a "difficult" poem, and it is certainly not "obscure." But great poetry is itself capable of furthering our limited vision. "Grass" sets us to "exalted brooding." We do not stop with Austerlitz, the travellers, the conductor, or the grass. The place-names signify the war-mongering tendency of man. The travellers are the generations of mankind. Grass is the great leveller even as time is; and both are also great healers. Time labours constantly to eradicate the gaping wounds of war and make the earth a land of peace. But generation after generation of mankind continues to shatter peace and poison Time.

Though the poem sounds a helpless note, Sandburg triumphs by his absolute control of emotion and perfect structural mastery. And who knows, at some time in future, somebody may take heed of the accusation embedded in this poem and successfully attempt a world union. It cannot be that venerable poets like Carl Sandburg are born altogether in vain. Theirs is a prophetic voice raised in benediction over mankind.

PREMA NANDAKUMAR

New Books and Old

Rudyard Kipling*

PROFESSOR DOBREE looks at Kipling from two significant stances. In the first place, Kipling is viewed as the man from the West, a part of the Imperialist machine, recording minutely the socio-political heartbeats of a colonial country in an age of transition. In the second place, Kipling is seen as a neo-Aesop immortalizing certain set behavioural patterns into recognizable personalities. These two views of Kipling presently coalesce into a whole in the study of Kipling's works in their totality, and therein lies the importance of Bonamy Dobrée's contribution. Besides, as he confesses, the book is in a way his personal appreciation of a great writer. Thus, though one may not agree with Professor Dobrée always, one may still feel disarmed by such enthusiasm and conviction, for these are rather rare in the present age that seems to put a premium on negative criticism.

How far can a man's personality be dug up from his creative work? Professor Dobrée proves a patient critic, and reconstructs from the fiction and poetry the entire gamut of emotions to which the living Kipling seems to have thrilled. We begin with the religion of Kipling. Influenced by his Christian upbringing and his Indian experiences, he certainly believed in a hereafter. And though he had a store of "religious musings," he also drew the line at the point where rational thinking needs must stop. Beyond that he would not venture. Among his "basic intuitions," Dobrée lists "the loneliness of man," "the abysmal sense of individual nothingness," and "the horror of great darkness." All this reminds us of another great modern writer — Franz Kafka. However, unlike Kafka, Kipling — if his stories and poetry are any indication — released himself from this loneliness and darkness, and constructed for himself a philosophy of living which was made up of work, sunshine, laughter, and compassion. He certainly believed in hard work: "There is no anaesthesia so complete as a man's absorption in his own job." Apart from this negative help, work also provides a positive direction to life and fills it with purpose. And Kipling believed in doing this heavy work with laughter and mirth. Professor Bodelsen calls this "cosmic mirth," a purposeful laughter that tries to brush away the shadows of darkness. Work and laughter, leavened by a rare compassion and a desire for healing the other man's sorrow, made up Kipling's philosophy of living.

Kipling was also greatly concerned with the actual "framework of living." Himself one of the minority, the ruling community of Anglo-Indians, he was not insensitive to the cruelties and the suppressions that the British imposed upon the vast mass of a subject nation. At the same time, he retained the right perspective, and saw clearly the good work done in India by the foreigners at the cost of personal health and happiness. This brings us unobtrusively to Kipling's idea of the Empire. If he saw that most of the men who came to serve the Empire began to love the land, he certainly was right. For, though only a few names like Sir Thomas Munro and Lord Ripon are well-known, there is no doubt that there was a large band of devoted servants of the Empire. They managed to rule with the minimum amount of irritation, and this was an achievement which seems generally to elude our present rulers. Kipling knew

**Rudyard Kipling: Realist and Fabulist.* By BONAMY DOBREE. (Oxford University Press, London. 244 pp. 1967. 30s.)

that one day the sun would set upon the Empire, and the devotion of the servants might have no thanks from the saved:

> And when your goal is nearest
> The end for others sought
> Watch sloth and heathen Folly
> Bring all your hopes to nought.

Yet one had to apply oneself to the task, when the task was there present. The so-called imperialists were the ones who made "iron sacrifice of body, will, and soul." One might criticize Kipling as over-enthusiastic about the picture of noble sacrifice; nevertheless, it remains at least part of the total truth.

Kipling the realist snapped the teeming life of Indian society in all its vividness: the beggars and the holy men; the underprivileged and the fattened exploiters; domestic heroism and public chicanery; and, of course, army life. The "cosmic laughter" saves them all from sentimentalism or morbidity. Dobrée assesses Kipling's fables under the headings "moral, political, mysterious, philosophical." His is a comprehensive and integral study, and hence most satisfying.

Dobrée has also made a complete study of Kipling's poetry. He finds a "tremendous vigour" in the song-lyrics, commends the romantic opulence of the poems, and points out the recurring theme of loneliness. Finally, he lays particular stress on the poetry of "actuality" that is found in the poems written towards the end of Kipling's career. "Gethsemane," "The Hyaenas," "Epitaphs of War," and "The Disciple" come within this group. These contain the knowledge of humanity's sub-human behaviour, and hence they are rather bitter in their articulation. But more terrible in the evocation of particular states of being are poems like "Hymn to Physical Pain" and "Hymn of Breaking Strain." Bare of imagery, scarcely lyrical, they till the lands within man, and condense the vapour of experience into "granitic" crystals.

Dobrée's study is a welcome approach to a misunderstood writer, and provides an excellent introductory critique of Kipling's entire work. Perhaps some reviewers may cavil at the descriptive criticism of Dobrée, but all will be united in praising his enthusiasm, which infects his readers with his own enjoyment. And that, perhaps, is the only valid reason for the existence of literary criticism.

PREMA NANDAKUMAR

Reason in Existentialism. By RAMAKANT SINARI. (Popular Prakashan, Bombay. 264 pp. 1966. Rs. 28.00)

Anthropologists use the term "culture shock" to describe the impact of a totally new culture upon a stranger. The shock is most often accompanied by disapproval or even disgust, while not free from a sense of excitement that things can really be different from our familiar experience of them. Not unusually, this is followed by the sudden illumination of facts of human existence which had not been hitherto suspected. Western thought received such a shock in recent times from the revelations of Freudian psychology. By now it has been assimilated and become almost commonplace. Next came the challenge of Existentialism. There was something disturbing and provocative about it, which questioned the accepted philosophical traditions. Two decades ago, the most extravagant claims were put forward in its behalf on the one hand, and on the other, it was the butt for the most devastating criticism. Today, Existentialism has been more or less domesticated, and is beginning to be viewed in its proper perspective and its affinities, not only with early Greek and Christian thought, and Buddhism, but also with modern trends like Pragmatism, to be recognized. A vast literature has grown up round the topic, and this book is one more addition to it.

Being a doctoral thesis, it is not free from the usual limitations incidental to the "PH.D. industry." There is over-elaboration; ten words are used where one would do better. One very often cannot see the wood for the trees. After saying this, it must be conceded, and not grudgingly, that the book abounds in original insights, and is really a contribution to the study of the subject. The author sympathizes with the existentialist, and highlights "the fact that through existentialists' penetrating explorations some of the most amazing regions of human consciousness have been brought to our notice."

The book falls into two halves. The first deals with "The Challenge of Existentialism" and then proceeds to expound in detail the much discussed pioneers of the movement. These chapters have tabloid characterizations. Thus Sören Kierkegaard is associated with "Revolt against Reason"; Martin Heidegger with the "Discovery of Things"; Karl Jaspers with an "Antidote to Immanence"; Gabriel Marcel with the "Absurdity of Civilization"; and Jean-Paul Sartre with "Man's Condemnation to Freedom."

The second Part deals with the historical background and genesis of Existentialism, the emergence and primacy of feeling in the systems, the Existential categories, and finally the limits of existentialization. It is avowedly critical; but in the author's own words: "The criticism, wherever it occurs in the book, is never severe." But the author's contention that the presence of ratiocination and logical and psychological categories in the writings of existentialists is a limitation on the existential "method" itself cannot be admitted. Existential experience is one thing, and its communication another. To take an example, it may be pointed out that the employment of words in the Upaniṣads detracts in no way from the validity of the declarations that the supreme experience is ineffable and does not lend itself to description in words.

Thus it may be said that the expository part of the book is more interesting and successful than the critical. (In regard to the latter aspect, reference may be made here to two outstanding works which have been reviewed in these columns: *Irrational Man* by William Barret, and *Beyond Existentialism* by J. Von Rintelen.) Speaking generally, it may be observed that there are very few references to Indian thought, even where the parallelism is very close. At points the author appears to be on the verge of doing so, but misses the chance. Thus he deals at great length with the existential idea of Nothingness, but fails to connect it with the well-known Buddhist concept of *Śūnya*. Again, in his conclusion and summing up, he stresses the factor of joy and asserts: "The joy of existing in the world is the joy of being predisposed to the absolute." But he does not make the obvious reference to the Upaniṣadic *Ānanda*, which he surely must have had at the back of his mind. And the solitary reference he makes to the *Ātman* (p. 221) cannot be considered altogether happy. When he equates it with absolute freedom and the quiddity of Being, we may wholeheartedly agree. But in the next sentence he asserts: "It is the passion, the very law of the ontological existence, the mode of life without internal or external restraints." The association of "passion" with the *Ātman* is wholly foreign to Indian thought, unless that word is to be understood in a sense which negates its primary connotation.

K. GURU DUTT

The Commonwealth of the Mind. By WALTER H. SLACK. (Philosophical Library, New York. 184 pp. 1967. $4.00)

Any "intellectual journey" through the Commonwealth of the Mind must be interesting, and so this book undoubtedly is. But to stop short at the

mind's boundaries is to feel a sense of limitation, and when the writer avows Ethical Humanism as his philosophy, we know all at once what will be excluded. For him there are no "ultimates," such as absolute Truth or Justice, beyond the phenomenal, but only ideational concepts which vary according to different cultures. Yet he admits man's need to believe in something greater than himself and with Unitarian tolerance accepts religious pluralism. "Religion — broadly considered — is not without great social value, for its comfort to the dying, solace of the living and its role of moral policeman of the populace." [!] Also, he recognizes the presence of pre-existing laws in the universe, though he cannot associate their outward expression with any deity.

However, if Professor Slack fights shy of deities it is largely because their devotees, of every faith, have claimed such unjustified authority and blighted the human spirit. He judges no system harshly, and what he says of the Catholic Church is interesting in view of its involvement with contemporary issues and partial adjustment to modernity. Also, he warns us of one of the worst enemies in our midst: "The era of the pseudo-intellectual is upon us in all its fury."

He may well repudiate this type, being himself so conversant with the greatest minds of all the ages, of whom, in fact, he is so knowledgeable that we grow a little dazed as dialecticism, determinism, naturalism, causality, selectivity, relativity, and the rest are passed in rapid review.

Particularly interesting are those sections dealing with "Fate" or "Destiny," with "Appreciation of the Aged," and with Gandhiji and his campaign of non-violence. That on birth-control is topical and informative, though one returns thankfully to the *ne plus ultra* of *brahmacharya*. The colour-bar, carol-playing, car-driving, disfiguring roadside advertisements — all are used by Professor Slack to "spin this philosophical web."

The book, which consists of short aphorisms and lengthy essays, is dedicated "to Robert G. Ingersoll, Barrister for the Defence of Man."

JOAN N. BURNETT

"Instinct" and "Intelligence": The Science of Behaviour in Animals and Man. By S. A. BARNETT. (MacGibbon and Kee Ltd., London. 250 pp. Illustrated. 1967. 45*s*.)

S. A. Barnett is a zoologist working at Glasgow University and he is well-known for his studies on the behaviour of the rat. This book deals with many different aspects of the behaviour of a variety of animals, ranging from worms to man. It is a useful contribution to the new science of ethology (behaviour).

The first part of the book consists mainly of an account of the physiology of the nervous system. This is clearly written, though the normal scientific terms are used throughout and might alarm a layman glancing through the book. Anyone who really wishes to understand the subject can easily do so, however, since the author's style is clear and there are many good diagrams.

The second part of the book deals with subjects such as learning, courtship, and communication. Again, the whole range of animal species is considered, including man. There is a particularly fascinating section on hive-bees and their waggle dance. The third section deals briefly with heredity and environment and with the "instinct" and "intelligence" of the title; the final fourth section is concerned with the sources of human behaviour as shown by the study of monkeys.

In addition to the numerous black and white diagrams, there are four pages of photographs in the centre of the book, illustrating aspects of animal

behaviour. The author refers frequently to the research work of other scientists and full references appear under chapter headings at the end of the book; this adds greatly to the value of the book for anyone wishing to study ethology in depth. There is also an index.

There are many passages in the book which, although brief, could stimulate new trains of thought and provide themes for discussion. Thus, on p. 149 the author quotes:

> A child which asks for food ... or calls attention to a conspicuous object is still a little animal. When it begins to tell its mother where it has gone, or what it has seen, it becomes a human being.

Many of the subjects included in this book are complex and controversial but the author succeeds in most cases in giving a clear picture of the present state of knowledge. The book can be recommended to anyone who is interested in ethology and could form a useful reference book for those who are intending to study the subject in detail.

PHYLLIS G. CROFT

Movement and Emptiness. By L. C. BECKETT. (Stuart and Watkins, London. 104 pp. 1968. 15*s*.)

Here is a close-knit appreciation and valid criticism of much that has passed for "scientific" thought in the last two decades.

Mr. Beckett values Science *per se*; his own appreciations are clearly in the aura of *The Secret Doctrine*; therefore, present comment on his excellent little book is conveyed via that great work of H. P. Blavatsky. (References are to the photographic facsimile of the original edition.)

LIGHT: The quanta of Planck as "packets of energy" find valid correction (by Beckett, p. 44) as "packets of motion, not of matter." This may endorse the view that light, as all else, "issues from Laya," and H. P. Blavatsky adds "... the zero-point being a condition, not any mathematical point" (*The Secret Doctrine*, I. 145).

It suggests likewise that we see but half of any light-wave: its hidden side passing through a junction-plane (*Antahkarana*) as a thread passing through a garment, allowing us to see but one side of the thread (cycle) and providing the "quanta" illusion by alternation — like the systole and diastole of Nature.

NO-THING (NOTHING): Some may question the tangible world as "Just a disturbance in emptiness!" (Beckett, p. 59) by regarding each atom itself as a hole in SPACE — a bubble in the only true *density*. The Eddington quotation *re* the atom "which overleaps space" is meaningless (p. 9). Yet H. P. Blavatsky speaks (*The Secret Doctrine*, I. 633) of "atoms, propelling their molecules into activity *from within*"; and follows by asserting: "... by their continuous vibration are ... MOTION." This is most revealing.

"ONE": L. C. Beckett aptly includes the thought that all is ONE (p. 64). This is the inception of "entity" when pre-genetic matter is formulated: ONE-NUMBER issued from "NO-NUMBER" of the Stanzas. The latter is a transcendence beyond ONE-ness — the Absolute.

Books of this calibre are stimulating and pleasant reading.

GRAHAME W. BARRATT

Companion to the Qur'ān: Based on the Arberry translation. By W. MONTGOMERY WATT. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 355 pp. 1967. 45*s*.)

Such a volume as this, expounding Islam's sacred book for Western readers ignorant of Arabic, has long been needed. Professor Watt of Edinburgh, author not only of standard works on Al-

Ghazali and the life of Muhammad but of many contributions to Muslim scholarship and philosophy, has here supplied a nearly perfect answer. Without impertinence, would not his book benefit by certain additions: e.g., a full-scale bibliography, and — an Islamic speciality — a list of Qur'ānic verses held officially to abrogate or be abrogated by others, such as Sweetman provides in his *Islam and Christian Theology*?

On the other hand, this *Companion* has peculiar virtues. Written from a standpoint that is neither Christian, nor Islamic, nor purely humanist, it is free from dogmatic or counter-dogmatic disfigurements. Its accuracy without pedantry is patent, and is revealed in the full index of Qur'ānic proper names and further index of words commented on, as well as in the notices on the chief variant interpretations.

Each *Sura*, or chapter, is clearly set forth in the structure of the whole, and its Medinan or Meccan origin shown. The Introduction has a useful analysis both of the ambiguities of certain Arabic words (e.g., *kasaba*, or *muslim* itself) and of the vagueness of reference ("to what particular persons or incidents does a verse refer?" — p. 11) exceptionally typical of the *Qur'ān*. Sometimes several verses seem treated in too summary a fashion, with merely a brief title, and one may search in vain for problems ventilated in other Qur'ānic discussions (random examples could be *Suras* 10^{5}, 39^{39}, 76^{8}, 78^{21-23}), on which Professor Watt is far more erudite than the present reviewer, who tenders sincere thanks to him for his valuable commentary, and to Professor Arberry, on whose translation this commentary is based.

TERENCE WHITE GERVAIS

Philosophy of Space and Time and the Inner Constitution of Nature: A Phenomenological Study. By MICHAEL WHITEMAN. (Muirhead Library of Philosophy. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London; Humanities Press, New York. 436 pp. 1967. 75*s*.)

Metaphysics, for so long regarded with suspicion by contemporary philosophers, seems to be making a comeback. This book is concerned with our basic concepts of space and time and how these may be derived. Dr. Whiteman blends phenomenological and conceptual analyses of perception, mind, and measurement with a metaphysical examination of the foundations and implications of quantum mechanics, geometry, and relativity. These arguments require close attention as many are quite technical, involving mathematics and concepts at a rarefied degree of abstraction. The literary style, though adequate, could have been more lucid.

Owing to the very wide range of topics covered, it is difficult for any one reviewer to evaluate them all adequately. The present reviewer's principal competence lies in one field covered — that is in the philosophy of perception and mind-brain relations. Dr. Whiteman supports a direct realist theory of perception and argues against the rival representative theory.

However, the account he gives of what he takes the latter to state (p. 42) shows that he has quite failed to understand it and the reasons that people have put forward for supporting it. For example, he says that the theory maintains (*a*) "that sensing is in some way a symbol which we have to interpret (by inference, "logical construction," "projection," settling of linguistic usages, etc.) in order to arrive at the concept and total impression of an "external object"; (*b*) that this construction, projection, etc., is *entirely private*; yet (*c*) such "objects," if not illusory, have a *public* character ... ." Sensing is not, however, a symbol to be interpreted or dealt with in any other way: it is

an activity in consciousness involving the confrontation between the Ego and sense-data. If by "sensing" he really means "sense data" — these are not symbols of objects either but are representations of them. The logic of representation is quite different from the logic of symbolism. Sense-data are in this view both the raw material of immediate experience and representations of the external world *constructed* by the sensory mechanisms: "inference" and "projection" are not concepts used in the modern version of the theory.

A modern account of the representative theory is given in my chapter in *Brain and Mind* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 1966). Dr. Whiteman's inadequate treatment of perception is a pity since his treament of physics — which is his own professional field — seems to be much more sophisticated. This failure forces him to produce a tortuous and implausible argument (p. 143) to account for the famous "time gap in perception" difficulty faced by all direct realists.

In conclusion, this book can be valued for its subtle analysis of the metaphysical aspects of quantum theory, the theory of measurement, and other aspects of physics. It is a pity, however, that the author's basic epistemology is weak and betrays an inadequate grasp of the theories that he rejects.

J. R. SMYTHIES

The Ancient Sun Kingdoms of the Americas: Aztec, Maya, Inca. By VICTOR WOLFGANG VON HAGEN. (Panther Books Ltd., London. 351 pp. 317 Illustrations. 1967. 15*s.*);

Peru Under the Incas. By C. A. BURLAND. (Life in Ancient Lands Series. Evans Brothers Limited, London. 144 pp. Illustrated; 18 Colour Plates. 1967. 35*s.*)

So complete was the sudden destruction of the Aztec, Maya, and Inca civilizations by mere handfuls of Spanish adventurers in the early sixteenth century — a story by turns fascinating, horrifying, and remarkable — that only latterly has a picture of the societies overwhelmed come into some kind of historical perspective, as a result of arduous reconstruction of archaeological and documentary evidence.

Scarcely any Aztec or Maya documents have survived to our time, so zealous were those prelates, Juan de Zumarraga and Diego de Landa, in burning all they could. We rely heavily on works written after the Conquest, such as the *Chilam Balam,* partly based on Mayan texts and only discovered in 1860. Not until 1863 did a manuscript about the monuments of Yucatan, written three centuries earlier by Diego de Landa himself, come to light in the Royal Library of Madrid. A work by Poma de Ayala, an obscure Spanish Inca, whose illustrations brought to life again the customs of the Incas, was found in 1908 at the Royal Library of Copenhagen. During the nineteenth century, such hardy explorers as Stephens and Maudsley began the rediscovery of monuments which had escaped the depravations of both Spaniards and the jungle. In recent decades archaeological investigation has made great progress, though more in Mexico than in Peru. The vagueness and misconceptions hedging our knowledge of pre-Columbian societies are gradually being removed.

A synopsis of our present knowledge is now available to the public at large through the publication of a paperback edition, copiously illustrated, of von Hagen's erudite and readable history. He describes the various tribes and societies preceding the three civilizations; gives a detailed account of their socio-economic structures; reviews their technical and artistic accomplishments; and comments upon their complex religious beliefs.

Archaeologist, anthropologist, scholar, explorer, life-time student of the American civilizations, von Hagen cannot be faulted for having left anything out, except in one respect. His focus is perhaps too narrow. At a time when serious attention is being paid to the possibility of there having once been some connecting links between the societies in America and others elsewhere, von Hagen treats the Americans — brilliantly no doubt — as if they had grown in isolation. Similarly what he tells us of their splendidly bizarre and cruel religious beliefs, demanding total dedication to the gods, has an exoteric quality. The gigantic temples, the strange intricacy of the sculpture and glyphs, and the metaphysical convolutions of the ancient texts are surely strongly suggestive of an esoteric symbolism which has not yet been penetrated. What is one to make, for instance, of the Mayan legend of a universal flood described in the Dresden Codex, widely held by scholars to derive from the first millennium A.D., or of the Mayan tradition that when the veil rose on their history they were entering the fifth recreation in their cosmology?

More provocative in style is C. A. Burland's admirable history of the Incas, which raises such questions as how to account for Peruvian ceramics on the Galapagos Islands, and whether there were trans-Pacific contacts through Polynesian sailors between south-east Asia and the Marquesa Islands. Dealing as he is with only one people, Burland has more scope than von Hagen to go into depth about the Incas, their administration, society, and religion and he gives a most convincing account of this truly remarkable culture, in so many ways more advanced than Europe at that time. Superb coloured plates accompany this history of a society which at its apogee was so cruelly cut down.

ELYANE M. HUNT

Indian Dances: Their History and Growth. By RINA SINGHA and REGINALD MASSEY. (Faber and Faber, London. 264 pp. Illustrated. 1967. 63*s*.)

One of the most popular aspects of Indian culture appealing to Western people is undoubtedly its dance and music. More than half the enquiries made to the London Branch of the Indian Institute of World Culture in recent years have referred to these.

This is a book to satisfy the questioning interest of Westerners as regards Indian dances, since it is not too technical for the general reader, while providing a good measure of information useful even to those with more specialist knowledge. Some twenty-eight illustrations, in addition to the colour frontispiece, show the various dances and dancers in action. The Introduction places dance-drama (the two were originally combined) in its general legendary and historical setting, giving the genealogy and anatomy, so to say, of the different developments of the classical Indian dances. The main sections of the book are devoted respectively to the South Indian Dasi Attam (Bharata Natyam); to Kathakali, with its fantastic and elaborately stylized costumes and make-up; to Kathak, influenced by the romantic Vaishnavite cult and by Mughal patronage; to Manipuri and various other styles, including the modern interpretations of Uday-Shankar, the first dancer-producer to awaken the West to the mysterious charm of the Indian dance, between the two world wars.

The book includes a map showing the main centres of the dances, a biographical list of "Gurus and Dancers," a bibliography and glossary. It is indeed a fascinating and valuable survey.

L. MARR

Vegetarian Handbook, 1968–1970. (London Vegetarian Society, London. 109 pp. Paper cover, 2*s*. 6*d*.)

A most useful little booklet. It gives a comprehensive list of vegetarian hotels, guest houses, curative homes, Health Food stores, and restaurants in the United Kingdom. Wisely, it confines itself to stating facts, without comment or criticism. There is also an "Overseas Section" comprising nearly thirty pages of addresses in other parts of the world. At the end is a section entitled "Vegetarian Food Hints for Continental Hotels." This should prove a godsend to the vegetarian traveller who has only a meagre knowledge of the language of the country.

Last, but by no means least, is a list of "Vegetarian Organizations," and "General Facilities." The latter makes it clear that vegetarian meals *can* be obtained in hospitals and in H. M. Forces — a fact of which many people are not aware.

We can recommend this booklet as a *vade mecum* for all vegetarians.

C. BERNARD

Ends and Sayings

"... ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

—SAMUEL BUTLER: *Hudibras*

Only a few years back the prophecy, published 1892, of a future "*Terreur,* which will affect all Europe when it comes, and not one country alone" would have seemed fantastic. Today it appears much more probable, and, unexpectedly, from students of the various nations. Yet the 1790s' *Terreur* was only the dark shadow that followed a reforming movement for Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, in the face of deprivation, the injustices of privilege, the tyranny of power. Today, the revolt of university students has produced, in the past months, riots in Berlin, London, Paris, where, in the last-named, they have escalated into battles, and, by mid-May 1968, set off nation-wide demonstrations among farmers and strikes among workers, producing chaos that has also cut communications and services. In Britain there are lesser upheavals at Essex, the "liberal" university, Oxford, and colleges and universities of the north-east. Across the Atlantic, Columbia University, New York, following student disturbances, has issued a manifesto of its principles.

All these are the dark side. What is the originating motive? Though obviously not clearly conceived by many students, it would seem to stem from a revulsion from the values of a materialistic society, the inhumanity of Viet Nam and germ warfare, and the regimented patterns of life and mass production, and from a desire for freedom, for participation, equality in responsibility. Anne Duchene writes (*The Guardian,* 20 May 1968):

> If ... the students are only trying to say ... that a whole new "world" is necessary — new relationships, that is, in almost every context: between countries, between men, and in all men's obligations towards their society and their work — then the sooner somebody can make the message plainer, the better everyone can debate the adjustment.

The Columbia manifesto points out the need to re-examine what role students should play in the responsibilities of academic administration (and this point is being increasingly discussed

in British universities), but "some advocates of student power apparently seek the role of sole decider rather than adviser or even participant. ... Students are markedly diverse in motivation, experience and outlook" (*The Guardian,* 18 May 1968).

Responsibility is man's heritage as man, but, paradoxically, still has to be earned. Will the rising tide become the real freedom that unites self-responsibility with the recognition of obligations to all beings as one whole? Or will it turn into the licence of selfishness and the anarchy that destroys the whole of corporate existence? Ideas must be clarified lest blind desire become master.

The spate of recent organ transplants make it necessary to recognize that medical experts cannot agree on a proper basis for the definition of death.

At the World Medical Assembly the suggested times after which the brain could be assumed dead for ever varied between five minutes and 48 hours. (*The Guardian,* 30 April 1968)

The Conseil International des Organizations des Sciences Médicales at Geneva has criticized Dr. Christian Barnard of South Africa for his procedure, as for contradictions in his evidence (*France-Soir,* 27 April 1968).

The first liver transplant in Britain took place at Cambridge, 2 May 1968, about the same time as the first heart transplant in this country, in London. The first lung transplant was carried out at Edinburgh on 16 May. The Bishop of Durham, Dr. Ian Ramsay, has called for a Church of England group to consider "the medical, moral, legal, philosophical, and theological aspects." The Church and Nation committee of the Church of Scotland, concerned about the sanctity of human life, has condemned the suggestion of a Soviet surgeon that

organs for spare parts could be stored by temporary grafts on to the exterior of human "vegetables" who through accident or disease had lost all intelligent life. (*The Guardian,* 7 May 1968)

In a clear-sighted Letter to the Editor (*Sunday Telegraph,* 12 May 1968) Dr. J. D. Gomersall points out that such operations may well mean the neglect of the "causative factors in many chronic illnesses for which much surgery is performed," i.e., the emotional and physical stresses of life today. "There is danger of the growth of a mass delusion that the answer to our problem exists in the hands of some God-like medical scientist."

Transplanting an alien organ into the "host" body means that the latter's natural protective mechanism, that causes "rejection," has to be broken. This natural immunity is negated, for the surgeon's purposes, by immuno-suppressive drugs, which must be taken for the rest of the patients' lives, putting them in permanent risk of infection. The latest drug announced by Sir Peter Medawar, director of the National Institute for Medical Research in London, will, it is predicted, render possible "the transplantation of healthy organs from specially-bred chimpanzees, pigs, and other animals" into humans, since the rejection barrier will have been broken (*The Observer,* 19 May 1968). (What kind of human-bestial beings will result?) Another conscience-searching point is the extensive experimentation on animals entailed. Donald Gould in "The Truth About Transplants" (*New Statesman,* 10 May 1968) calls, alas! for more of this before proceeding further with human subjects, but he does bring out some significant points. Kidney grafts, now routine practice, are only really "successful" when from a living blood-relation. Yet psychological troubles are liable to attack both donor and recipient. Physically both are at risk, since each has only half their renal reserve, and may need to fall back on the kidney machine. He too mentions living vegetables kept "alive" by res-

piration machines, and the suggestion (when the "donor" is judged beyond recovery) to switch off at a time that suits the recipient. He asks, "Are we prepared to allow our doctors to take such decisions?" This brings us back to the comments at the Geneva medical reunion mentioned above. Dr. Barnard had said it was an insult not to have confidence in the doctors who know. His critics reply that the title of doctor is not always a guarantee. Otherwise, it would have meant an equal confidence in the Nazi medical men (*France-Soir*, 27 April 1968).

Michael Billington, television critic (*Times Saturday Review*, 18 May 1968), condemns the way television programmes are blurring fiction and fact. Incidentally, this is an extension of the method of the radio serial, such as *The Archers*, whose imaginary family is now almost more real to their audiences than actual men and women. Mr. Billington considers that the treatment of Hamlet by some Shakespearean criticism as an actual outside-the-play person still does not reach the complete confusion between life and art that deludes television viewers. The case of an actress playing the part of a councillor in a television series, and being swamped consequently with letters asking for advice, can be paralleled with many others. Viewers' confusions, he writes, are understandable when news, documentaries, plays and what not, all pour out unendingly, with no discrimination between them, and he accuses the television companies of unethical irresponsibility in encouraging this gullibility He condemns also a *Radio Times* quiz (11 May 1968) on Angleton, an imaginary town in the series *The Newcomers*.

The harm of this general policy is — first, it destroys the subtle pleasure that blends life and art rightly (involvement in the "reality" of the drama, while keeping awareness, as a spectator, of its skill, and of the outside world); secondly, those who are confused about the reality of what they see, are vulnerable to unscrupulous manipulation; and thirdly,

> to encourage people to try to remember minor incidents from a twice-weekly television serial is to encourage a preoccupation with trivia that is almost beyond comprehension.

How modern the psychology of Gautama Buddha is!

> Those who live in the pleasure-ground of fancy see truth in the unreal and untruth in the real. They never arrive at truth.
>
> Those who abide in the world of right thought see truth in the real and untruth in the unreal. They arrive at truth. (*The Dhammapada*, vv. 11-12)

Dr. J. A. Hadfield in *Psychology and Morals* makes a distinction between the ideal towards which we work and the fantasy with which we identify ourselves; the first beneficent, the second harmful. It is not sufficiently recognized that imagination is a creative power, by which we can re-create ourselves and our environment. Otherwise we would not feed it with candy-floss instead of the bread of life.

De Profundis

O horrible, O extreme crime
Against the Supreme Being!
They have robbed me of my heart
And exchanged it for another!
In vain I weep for this heart no longer mine,
For this great distracted dream
Of which I was the apostle.
From its intimate home, its divine union
This heart is torn away,
Science is pitiless, and suddenly I find myself
In an unknown world, without love, without links,
Where all within me dies.
I listen with terror
To the new beating vibrating in my depths,
And without cessation I implore the heavens,
the earth, an angel,
"What is this strange song, this voiceless call
I cannot recognize?" And the angel replies:
"Have no fear, I am there to surrender your heart
To your brothers also. Keep for ever your faith
In this unique universe and its divine mystery.
Nothing can destroy the sacred union between heart,
body, and soul,
Nor the flame of the Spirit entrusted to us.
So have respect for this stranger you carry within you,
Remember it is a heart which another being claims,
Which for this other is the soul.
Patiently await the divine moment,
The hour when you will find again, O despairing hearts,
The great dream so cruelly ruined resuscitated in you,
For man will never unveil the mystery of your
divine union.
Therefore let us sing together, our voices steady
and clear,
The ultimate hymn of faith,
Lord, Alleluia!"

From the French of CLEMENCIA BONNET-MATHEWS
Free translation by DALLAS KENMARE